

THE DETERMINANTS OF BASE OPERATING SUPPORT COSTS

Daniel B. Levine James M. Jondrow

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF

Participants: Deborah L. Hasson, Kevin B. Garvey, Robert M. Burke

scale in BOS spending that could be captured through base consolidation; how a given total BOS budget should be allocated across bases that differ in characteristics; and whether statistically-derived cost estimating relationships are better tools for analysis of BOS spending than simple ratios, such as BOS cost per mission person, that are favored by OSD.

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THE DETERMINANTS OF BASE OPERATING SUPPORT COSTS

Daniel B. Levine James M. Jondrow

Enclosure (1) to CNO ltr Ser 964C6/333332 dated 23 July 1981



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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350

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From: Chief of Naval Operations

To: Distribution List

Subj: Base Operating Support (BOS) Study Report; promulgation of

Encl: (1) CNA Study CNS 1156, "The Determinants of Base Operating Support Costs"

- 1. The Base Operating Support Study set out to develop algorithms to estimate base operating support (BOS), costs, utilizing an existing historical data base and statistical regression analysis, as a function of the characteristics of individual installations.
- 2. The study analyzed data from the Domestic Base Factors Report (1979) describing 144 domestic naval installations in CONUS, Hawaii, and Alaska, categorized by primary mission (e.g., naval air stations). The BOS cost estimating relationships (CERs) that finally evolved from the statistical regression analysis included five explanatory variables: number of active military personnel, number of civilian personnel, building area, land area, and energy consumption. For the CER derived, the standard statistical measure for goodness of fit, coefficient of correlation, was 0.90. This favorably contrasts with the 0.11 coefficient of correlation for BOS cost as a linear function of number of mission persons on the base, a CER currently used in some DOD offices.
- 3. Because of the goodness of fit of this CER, it will be worthwhile to examine more closely those bases whose costs depart significantly from the predictions. The Shore Activities Planning and Programming Division (OP-44) has begun a detailed evaluation of these base outliers to the regression line to determine in each case whether special circumstances explain the BOS cost deviation from the CER prediction.
- 4. Based on a statistical regression analysis of the Domestic Base Factors Report (1979), this study indicates that, for analytical purposes, the CERs derived herein are better estimators of BOS cost than the simple, one variable equations in common use.

5. Enclosure (1) is forwarded.

M. S. HOLCOMB Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy Director, Navy Program Planning

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A naval shore base requires many resources that are not specific to the particular missions supported by the base. Such Base Operating Support (BOS) resources include: maintainance and repair of real property; financial, legal and other administrative services; specific services such as base transportation and security; and community support functions such as medical clinics and commissary. These activities account for about \$2 billion annually in the Department of Navy budget.

The Navy needs a model of BOS costs to help manage the shore establishment. This study develops such a model -- a cost estimating relationship, or CER -- and applies it to the policy questions of whether consolidating bases would save on BOS cost, and whether BOS funds are being wisely allocated across installations during the yearly budget process. The CER is derived from data in the FY 1979 Domestic Base Factors Report (DBFR), and verified using data in the FY 1980 DBFR. Statistical regression techniques are used to relate BOS spending to such variables as the number of military and civilian personnel at the base, the size of the base as measured by total acreage and building area, and the base's energy consumption.

The CER implies that the Navy could save about 15 percent in annual BOS cost by halving the number and doubling the size of its bases. This finding does not mean that consolidation would save on total cost. Consolidation could require spending for new land, new construction and re-settlement (fixed costs). Consolidation might also affect direct, mission-related operating costs and operational readiness. By ignoring these factors, we can make no overall judgments about the desirability of consolidation.

To help in the yearly budget process, the CER is used to estimate ah "expected" level of BOS funds for each base in the sample. Those bases spending more than "expected" are offered as candidates for more detailed analysis by the Navy. We are not claiming that these bases are inefficient; their higher spending could be for activities not captured by our aggregate data. The higher spending, moreover, could be contributing significantly to mission readiness and personnel retention -- benefits of BOS spending that are not measured in this analysis of cost.

Other findings of the study are: 1) BOS decisions should not be based on simple performance ratios such as BOS cost per mission person that are favored by OSD, and 2) the DBFR is a unique source of BOS data, but it could be reduced in size to

ease the reporting burden and still provide enough data for statistical analysis of BOS cost.

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INTRODUCTION

The resources to maintain a Naval shore installation are of two types. Some resources directly support the missions carried out by the base. At a naval air station, for example, the direct costs pay for the military personnel who maintain and fly the squadron aircraft, the fuel to operate these aircraft, and the civilians employed at a Naval Air Rework Facility (NARF) that may be located at the base.

This study is concerned, however, with the indirect costs of operating bases. Such Base Operating Support (BOS) costs are not specific to missions, but would be required to maintain any shore installation, whether it is a naval air station, a naval station, a naval supply center, a laboratory, a hospital, or another type of installation. Maintaining and repairing the buildings is one example. How much you have to do does not usually depend on what missions the buildings support. Transportation and security maintained by the host of the base are also BOS functions, as are legal, medical, and administrative services performed by the base. Table 1 shows the four functional categories into which BOS resources are often grouped.

A major reason for studying BOS cost is that large expenditures are involved: the Navy spends about two billion dollars annually on these resources. A more immediate reason is the recent Congressional interest in BOS. Using data supplied by OSD, the Senate Appropriations Committee in 1977 compared BOS spending by 18 installations. The Committee took direct budget action based on these findings: Bases with high BOS cost per mission person received cuts in BOS funds. (Some of the cuts were subsequently removed through re-programming.)

For use in future budget reviews, the Senate Appropriations Committee also asked OSD to develop and submit a yearly reporting system for BOS cost and its determinants. The resulting Domestic Base Factors Report (DBFR) is a unique source of data, and its analysis is the subject of this study. We will present, in turn, the policy issues to be addressed, the method of analysis, a description of the data, the numerical results, and the implications of these results for the policy issues.

TABLE 1

EXAMPLES OF BOS RESOURCES

Facility Services

Maintenance and repair of all real property Minor construction Utilities Custodial and janitorial services

Administrative Services

Base administration Base comptroller Base legal services

Specific Services

Base transportation
Base security, fire and police
Base communications

Community Support Services

Medical and dental clinics Commissary Recreation

ISSUES FOR ANALYSIS

This study derives a statistical Cost Estimating Relationship (CER) that relates BOS spending at a naval base to the characteristics of the base. This CER provides insight into five issues concerning management of the Naval shore establishment. The first is economies of scale. The Navy's domestic shore establishment is somewhat spread out across the country, and this raises the question of whether consolidating small bases into larger ones would save money. This analysis measures the economies of scale in BOS spending. BOS cost is only one part of the picture, however. Consolidation can also affect direct operating costs and operational efficiency. Any savings in yearly costs would have to be balanced against possible fixed costs for new land, new military construction, and re-settle-These fixed costs would depend, in turn, on how much excess capacity we have at existing bases and how much of our original investment we could recoup by selling off unneeded land. Our analysis of BOS cost thus provides only one input to the consolidation decision.

The second application of the cost estimating relationship (CER) concerns the Navy's yearly allocation of the BOS budget across bases. Here, too, a CER can provide some help but not the complete answer. The CER presents a picture of what bases with various characteristics have been spending for BOS. It thus estimates what a particular base would spend if it fits the general pattern. If that base is spending much more than this, that suggests a closer, more detailed look is in order. We have used the CER to construct a list of candidate bases for detailed study by the Navy.

The next issue focuses specifically on the methods for allocating BOS. As described above, this study derives a CER from statistical analysis of the data. Lacking anything better, the Navy has for years been allocating BOS by giving a base what it got last year, plus some allowance for inflation, plus some additional funds if the base appeared to have special problems. In the interest of finding a more systematic approach, OSD has recently suggested using simple ratios such as BOS cost per mission person. If one naval air station has much higher BOS cost per mission person than the average for all naval air stations, that base is a potential candidate for a budget cut. The third issue thus considers whether a statistically-derived CER is really better than the OSD method for budget determination.

The fourth issue concerns the cost estimates for ships and aircraft that are listed in the Navy Program Factors Manual. The method for deriving CER's in this study can be used to update the BOS components of these costs.

A major limitation underlies the analysis of these questions. We lack a measure of the benefits of BOS. Consider BOS expenditures for maintenance, for example. Unless the Navy maintains and repairs real property, sooner or later the buildings will crumble and the base will be unable to carry out its missions. But there is no current measure of the relationship between expenditures on maintenance and the level of readiness. The connection is diffuse, and attempts to construct the relationship would take us too far afield.

Other BOS activities provide community services to improve the quality of life and help make the Navy an attractive career. Analyzing the relationship between BOS and retention would also be a study in itself. Re-enlistment depends on the community services at all the shore installations to which a sailor has been assigned during his recent service, and assembling this time-series data for individuals would not be a simple task.

Lacking numerical measures of output, we cannot make ultimate judgments about the "optimal" size of the Navy's BOS budget or its allocation across bases. Consider two naval air stations that are alike in all major respects, but that spend different amounts for BOS. The lower cost base might be spending the ultimately correct amount for BOS, given the benefits of readiness and retention. The more expensive air station would then be regarded as inefficient.

On the other hand, it might be the more expensive base that was spending the ultimately correct amount for BOS. In this case, the cheaper base would be inefficient, even though it was operating on a more parsimonious level with regard to BOS spending.

These considerations will affect how we interpret the results of the quantitative analysis.

METHODOLOGY

This section describes the method of analysis and shows how the numerical results can be applied to the policy issues.

The goal is to explain BOS cost at 144 of the domestic naval installations included in the DBFR. I For purposes of this study, to "explain" BOS cost means to relate it to base characteristics that are assumed to determine its value. Statistical regression, or "curve-fitting" techniques are used for this purpose, and the result is an equation that looks as follows (for illustration):

BOS cost = a_o (MIL) al (CIV) a2 (AREA) a3

where

MIL = the number of active military personnel at the base

CIV = the number of civilian personnel AREA = total building area in thousands of square feet

The coefficients of the equation $(a_0 \text{ through } a_3)$ will be estimated by fitting the equation to the data.

This is mainly a cross-section study: the statistical analysis is across bases at a fixed point in time (1979). The resulting CER was checked, however, against data in the 1980 DBFR. The statistical fit proved almost as good as for the 1979 data. This gives some confidence in using the CER for future prediction provided the estimated BOS costs are adjusted for inflation.

Various features of the regression equation will provide information on the issues mentioned above. The sum of the exponents will measure the economies of scale, and show how much BOS cost can be saved through consolidation. If $a_1+a_2+a_3=0.5$, for example, doubling the size of a typical base (doubling the explanatory variables) would multiply BOS cost by a factor of only 1.4 ($2^{0.5}$). Consolidation would thus

Twelve other installations were omitted because data were incomplete (e.g., for the new Trident bases) or because the bases appeared unique (e.g., the Washington Navy Yard.)

lower BOS expenditure (but not necessarily total expenditure). Second, the difference between the "observed" BOS cost given by the data and the "predicted" BOS cost given by the regression equation will evaluate the base's spending against the standard of all the bases in the sample as a whole (after adjusting for MIL, CIV, AREA and the other variations at the base in question). Finally, with respect to planning, each exponent will estimate a marginal cost: how much BOS cost will rise, for example, with increases in the number of military personnel.

DATA

The validity of our findings hinges on our ability to obtain a regression equation that meets statistical and common-sense criteria. This depends, in turn, on our having enough good data on the installations of interest. This section of the report describes the variables we have obtained, and comments on their reliability.

The sample of bases consists of 144 domestic naval installations in CONUS, Hawaii, and Alaska. All large naval installations in the continental U.S. are included, along with major bases located in Hawaii and Alaska. The installations are all hosts — commands that have responsibility for providing BOS services to the tenants that reside on the base. Table 2 describes the sample further.

Each base is categorized by its primary mission: e.g., naval air stations. The classification is not clean: A host naval air station has aircraft squadrons in its list of tenants, but it may also have other tenants whose missions have nothing to do with air operations. This lack of homogeneity does not prove much of a problem: Our findings confirm that BOS cost as defined by the Navy does not depend on the type of mission at a base. The costs of maintenance and repair of real property, for example, depends on the area of the buildings, and little on what those buildings are used for.

Table 3 defines the variables gathered for each base in the sample. Except where noted, the source of the data is the FY 1979 Domestic Base Factors Report (DBFR). (Data from the FY 1980 DBFR became available toward the end of the study. These data were used only as a check on the numerical analysis of the 1979 data.) The DBFR data were "scrubbed" by OP-44 (Shore Activities Planning and Programming Division) in extensive conversations with the bases designed to achieve reporting consistency. Data from the previous two DBFRS (FY 1977 and FY 1978) were not scrubbed. They show major inconsistencies as a result, and were therefore not used in the analysis.

There is a point in listing all the explanatory variables that were assembled, even though only five proved necessary in obtaining a good aggregate predictive model for BOS cost. The point is that most of the variables that are reported by the DBFR because they appear related to BOS cost are not necessary for such a model, and collecting many of these data may add more to the "paperwork burden" than to useful knowledge.

TABLE 2

NAVAL INSTALLATIONS ANALYZED

- 30 Naval air stations 10 Naval bases, defined in this study to mean either a naval station, amphibious base, or submarine basel 6 Public works centers 16 Regional medical centers plus the National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda, Maryland 16 Training centers and schools Naval support activities 8 Naval shipyards 15 Supply and storage facilities including Naval supply centers, weapons stations and ordnance stations 13 Research and development sites Test and evaluation sites 5 Communications stations and security activities 1.3 Naval facilities, which are used in coastal anti-submarine warface
- 144 TOTAL

The term "naval base" is often used to mean a complex involving one or more naval stations, amphibious bases or submarine bases located together in one area.

TABLE 3

DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES

Dependent Variable

BOS COST

Total spending by each installation during FY 79 on base operating support resources (in millions of FY 79 dollars).

Physical Plant Variables

AREA

Total floor area of buildings in square feet.

ACRE

Total acreage of land on base.

CPV

Estimates of the current plant value of the real property on the base. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NavFac) made these estimates by taking the original acquisition cost of each building and inflating it to current FY 79 dollars using a construction cost index. Subsequent improvements were assumed to be made at the time of original acquisition because the dates of the improvements have not been kept until recently. The estimated values of CPV are therefore biased upward, and the bias is larger for the older installations.

AGE

The average age of all buildings on the base calculated from data supplied by NavFac. The age of each building was weighted by its size in square feet.

Personnel Variables

MIL

The number of active military personnel, officers plus enlisted, at the base. BOS and mission personnel are both included. The variable refers to the average number of men physically present at the base during the year, not the number authorized. Average transient load is thus included. In addition, OP-44 instructed bases to include the number of men assigned to ships serviced by the base, whether the ships were homeported there or not. The number of men assigned to ships was multiplied by 60 percent to account for the time these ships spent out of port.

CIV

The number of civilian personnel, those assigned to BOS as well as to mission tasks.

RES

The average number of reserve personnel physically on the base during the year.

RET.

The number of retired military personnel in the vicinity of the base.

DEP

The number of dependents excluding the sponsor. The number living both on and off the base were regarded as separate variables.

SF

The number of staff and faculty assigned to installations engaged, at least partly, in training.

STUD

The average daily student load at training installations.

BASE

The number of active military personnel at naval bases (naval stations, amphibious bases, and submarine bases) with shore-side assignments.

BOS

The number of military plus civilian personnel assigned to BOS functions.

Operational Variables

PLANES

The average number of aircraft normally stationed at the base. Those aircraft assigned to the base but deployed elsewhere during the year are not counted.

NARF

The number of civilian personnel at naval air stations assigned to a NARF (Naval Air Rework Facility). The Force Distribution Report (FDR) maintained by NavFac is the source for this variable.

DISP

The total displacement (full) of ships assigned to the base. The list of ships assigned was obtained from the FDR, and the displacement of each type was obtained from the Naval Ships Register.

ELEC

The total electrical generating capacity of the ships assigned to the base. See the definition of DISP for the sources of the data.

COMP

The total complement of personnel on ships assigned to the base. See DISP for the sources.

SHP

The total shaft horsepower of ships assigned to the base. See DISP for the sources.

BED

The number of beds at regional medical centers (plus the National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda). OP-96 provided the data. The authorized and capacity number of beds were treated as separate variables.

Climate1

TEMP

The average daily temperature, calculated over the past 20 years.

COOLDAYS

The number of cooling-degree-days per year, averaged over the past 20 years. A temperature of 85 degrees Fahrenheit is used as the standard. If the average daily temperature on August 20 is 95 degrees, for example, this constitutes 10 cooling-degree days. Daily figures are added to give yearly totals.

HEATDAYS

The reverse of COOLDAYS. If the average daily temperature on December 20 is 45 degrees, for example, this constitutes 40 heating-degree-days.

PRECIP

The average yearly inches of precipitation for the base, averaged over the past 20 years.

SNOW

The yearly inches of snowfall during the year, averaged over the past 20 years.

The source for all these variables is Alva L. Wallis, Jr., Comparative Climatic Data Through 1976, National Climatic Center, Asheville, N.C., April 1977.

Other Variables

BTU

The total BTUs of energy consumed by the base during the year. Included are the use of electricity, coal and natural gas. One exception: fuel for sircraft is not included.

WAGE

An estimate of the average wage of civilian DoD employees hired by DoD in the locale. Regional wage scales by step and grale were furnished by the DOD Wage Fixing Authority. We selected the wage corresponding to the average grade of civilian workers at the base (from Office of Civilian Manpower Management), assuming he was at step 4, the Navy-wide average.

Type of Base

The set of "dummy" variables shown below were used. (NAS, for example, is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 at each of the 30 naval air stations, and the value 0 at each of the 114 other installations.) By using dummy variables, all regressions can be run on the total sample of 144 installations, but with the flexibility to estimate different coefficients at different classes of bases. The dependence of BOS cost on the number of military personnel, for example, will prove higher at naval stations than at other bases.

Dummy Variable	Bases where value = 1
NAS	Naval air stations
NARF	Naval air stations with NARFs
NB	Naval bases, defined in this study to be a naval station, amphibious base, or submarine base
PWC	Public works centers
мер	Regional medical centers plus the National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda, Maryland
ткысн	Training centers and schools
NSA	Naval support activities
SY	Naval shipyards
ss	Supply and storage facilities, defined in this study to include naval supply centers and naval weapon centers
RD	Research and development sites such as the Naval Research Lab
TE	Test and evaluation sites such as the one at China Lake, California
COMS	Communications stations and security activities
FAC	Naval facilities such as the one at Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, which are used for strategic ASW.

REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Regression analysis is a way to estimate the coefficients of a statistical relationship after the explanatory (independent) variables are chosen and the functional form of the equation (linear, log, etc.) has been selected. Ideally, the selection of explanatory variables should be based on prior knowledge of what factors most affect the dependent variable; and the form of the equation should be chosen according to knowledge about how the explanatory variables interact.

CHOICE OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES

There is too little understanding of BOS resource use at naval installations, however, to carry out this procedure in ideal form. We were not sure beforehand which variables are most important; many of those listed in table 3 appear closely related to BOS spending. We therefore used statistical criteria to help choose among them. Regressions were run with different combinations of variables, in hopes of finding a combination that met these criteria: (1) The sign of the coefficients should be the ones expected on intuitive grounds (e.g., more personnel means higher BOS cost); and (2) the coefficients of each explanatory variable should be statistically significant at the 10% level (high t-statistics in statistical terms). Meeting the latter criterion accomplishes two things. First, it tends to produce a "parsimonious" model in which a relatively small number of explanatory variables are able to account for a relatively high percentage of the

variability in BOS cost (a high value of R², in statistical terms). Second, it ensures that the regression will estimate the independent effect of each explanatory variable, even if the data for these variables are correlated. (See appendix table A-4 for the correlation coefficients.)

These are the explanatory variables that best met the tests of intuitive plausibility and statistical fit. First are two personnel measures. Bases with larger numbers of military personnel (MIL) must provide more legal and medical services, more bachelor housing and commissary, and more support services for dependents. Large numbers of civilians (CIV) are employed by the NARFs and by the research laboratories, and there is lots of equipment to be maintained and repaired.

Measuring independent effects requires only that the data show some independent movement of the variables. When the variables become too correlated to separate out their effects on the dependent variable, one or more t-statistics will fall. High t-statistics thus mean that the independent contributions have been estimated.

About half of all BOS cost is for maintenance and repair of real property, and building area (AREA) is a general indicator of the amount of real property that must be maintained and repaired. The total acreage (ACRE) at an installation is an indicator of physical size. Bases with larger amounts of land must spend more for base transportation and security and for maintenance of roads and grounds.

The final variable (BTU) measures the amount of power consumed by the utilities at the base. Energy consumption is a general measure of the tempo of operations at an installation.

Note that these five explanatory variables are measures of resources. BOS cost can also be related to operational variables such as the number of aircraft, and we will discuss this in the section on Marginal Cost of Base Expansion.

CHOICE OF FUNCTIONAL FORM

There is no firm intuition about whether the relationship between these explanatory variables would be linear, exponential, or some other form. The exponential functional form was selected on a statistical basis: among various simple mathematical forms, it gave the best fit with the data.

RESULTS

The estimated relation is shown in table 4. The equation is an extension of simple curve-fitting where you take a two-dimensional scatter diagram and fit a straight line to get an idea of how y relates to x. The equation in table 4 involves 5 x's instead of one, and an exponential relationship instead of a linear one. The equation says that if you have a base with so many military personnel, so many civilian personnel, and so on, and if you insert these figures into the equation, you get a predicted value of BOS cost that tracks with the actual BOS cost in a statistical sense.

In fact, the equation fits the data to a remarkable degree. In addition to possessing intuitive appeal, the coefficients are all positive (more resources yield higher cost), the coefficients (exponents) of the explanatory variables all have high statistical significance, and the equation as a whole explains 90 percent of the variability in BOS cost.

The five explanatory variables proved best among the 70 we tested. We tried personnel variables like the numbers of dependents, retirees, and reserves. We distinguished between the civilians assigned to NARFs and to research laboratories. We tried operational variables like the number of aircraft at

TABLE 4

MAJOR REGRESSIONA

BOS COST = 0.0405(MIL).034(CIV).248(AREA).249(ACRE).061(BTU).155

where

State of the Control of the Control

MIL * number of active military personnel

CIV = number of civilian personnel

AREA = building area (thousand square feet)

ACRE = land area (acres) BTU = energy consumption

 R^2

.90b

t-statistics (level of statistical significance)C

MIL	1.76	(8%)
CIV	7.29	(.01%)
AREA	4.58	(.01%)
ACRE	3.54	(.05%)
BTU	3.94	(.01%)

Scale elasticity

.75d

The \mathbb{R}^2 of .90 means that the regression explains 90% of the variability in ln BOS COST. This is equivalent to explaining about 80% of the variability in BOS COST itself.

CThe 10 percent level is often used as a minimum criterion in empirical analysis.

dThis is the sum of the exponents of the explanatory variables. A scale elasticity of .75 implies that a 1 percent increase in all explanatory variables leads to a .75 percent increase in BOS COST. The interpretation is somewhat different for large changes: doubling all explanatory variables multiplies BOS COST by only $(2) \cdot ^{75} = 1.7$, which indicates positive economies of scale.

afor all installations, excluding naval bases, communications stations, and security activities.

bThe regression was actually estimated in the logarithmic form (ln stands for natural logarithm):

ln BOS COST = $ln 0.0405 + .034 \times ln MIL + .248 \times ln CIV + ...$

air stations, the total displacement of ships homeported at naval stations, the number of faculty at training installations, and the number of beds at hospitals. None of these yielded a more intuitive and statistically sound CER. (Note, however, that the operational variables are necessary in order to make estimates of marginal cost for use in force level studies, as described later.)

That it is possible to explain cost with so few variables means that these represent, in the aggregate, many of the more detailed determinants. Building area and acreage represent the overall size of the base including roads, fences, etc. The effect of the explanatory variables must therefore be interpreted in a particular way: the measured effect of increasing an included variable is actually the effect of increasing, as well, the broader set of determinants it represents.

This reinforces the point that BOS are general, non-mission related activities. And it also implies that having to construct the full DBFR of about 100 variables may add more to the Navy's reporting burden than to useful knowledge.

The exponential form of equation yields a single estimate of elasticity independent of base size. The exponent of MIL, for example, implies that a one percent increase in the number of military personnel leads to a .034 percent rise in BOS cost.

The coefficient for civilian personnel is much greater than for military personnel, possibly because civilians carry out BOS functions. AREA has a high coefficient because much BOS activity is devoted to the upkeep of buildings (Real Property Maintenance Activities, or RPMA).

The exponential form of equation has the property that the returns to scale (the scale elasticity) is the same regardless of base size. The elasticity of .75 means that doubling the size of a base would increase BOS COST by only 70 percent (see footnote d of table 4). Other functional forms that were rejected by the statistical criterion mentioned earlier do not have this property. The constant scale elasticity is thus a finding, not an assumption.

The major regression equation in table 4 does not distinguish among different types of base. In the process of estimating this equation, we checked to see if the regression

The elasticity of y with respect to x is defined as the percentage change in y that results from a 1% change in x.

coefficients would be different for different types of bases. It turned out that the coefficients had to be modified for only 23 installations: the 10 naval bases (a naval base was defined earlier to be a naval station, amphibious base or submarine base) and the 13 communications and security facilities. Table 5 shows the new estimated coefficients.

The clasticity associated with the number of active military personnel nearly doubles in value at the naval bases (but still remains lower than the coefficient on civilian personnel). The increase may be related to the fact that many military personnel associated with naval bases are stationed on ships and submarines serviced by the base. The piers and other shore-side facilities for these ships require maintenance, repair, and other support that may not be "picked up" by AREA, ACRE, and the other explanatory variables. (It is interesting, however, that none of the ship-related variables shown in table 3 increased the explanatory power of the regression.)

At the 13 communications stations and security group activities, the clasticity associated with military personnel also increases sharply. The coefficient of area almost disappears. Despite the large coefficient changes for Naval Bases and communications and security facilities, the scale clasticity remains close to the estimate of .75 found for the other kinds of bases.

It is remarkable that with so few exceptions, a single equation with only five variables is able to predict so well the BOS cost of a wide variety of naval installations: naval air stations, supply centers, weapons stations, research laboratories, weapons test ranges, shipyards, schools and so on. The explanation is the general nature of BOS resources mentioned above. If such highly aggregate variables as total personnel and area can explain BOS cost across different naval air stations, for example, it is plausible that bases with different missions would follow that same pattern. "A building is a building."

A later section will discuss the "robustness" of our findings: whether the findings are sensitive to the choices of explanatory variables, the functional form, and the use of 1980 data.

This was done by including dummy variables (shown in table 3) to indicate each type of base. The dummy variables were included linearly and also multiplied by the other variables. In all cases but those described in the text, the dummy variables lacked statistical significance at the 10% level.

TABLE 5

OTHER REGRESSIONS

10 Naval Bases

BOS COST = $0.0405(MIL)^{.066}(CIV)^{.248}(AREA)^{.249}(ACRE)^{.061}(BTU)^{.155}$

t-statistic

MIL

3.6

Scale elasticity .78

13 Communications Stations and Security Activities

BOS COST = $.0405(MIL) \cdot ^{234}(CIV) \cdot ^{248}(AREA) \cdot ^{0014}(ACRE) \cdot ^{061}(BTU) \cdot ^{155}$

t-statistic

MIL

2.3

AREA

.02

Scale elasticity

.70

NOTE: See table 4 for the value of R2, and for the t-statistics of those coefficients that did not change from the major regression. For comparison, the coefficient of MIL was .034 in the major regression, and the coefficient of AREA was .249.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

ECONOMIES OF SCALE

Can the Navy save BOS funds through consolidation? The scale elasticities shown in tables 4 and 5 suggest modest savings. Doubling all the resources at the base increases BOS cost by only 70 percent. (The scale elasticity is about .75, and 2 raised to this power is about 1.7).

Consider, for example, the case of naval air stations, whose BOS cost averages about \$35 million annually. If two "average" stations were combined into one, the total BOS cost would be only about \$60 million (1.7 x \$35 million). This is an annual saving of about \$10 million, or 15 percent from the \$70 million cost of operating the stations separately.

As we pointed out in the introduction, however, a saving in BOS cost is not a sufficient reason for consolidation. Consolidation might require spending for new land, new construction and re-settlement. Such fixed costs could outweigh the yearly savings in BOS cost (appropriately discounted to the present for comparison with the fixed costs). Readiness could also be affected: The largest organizations are not necessarily the smoothest-running. These effects must all be analyzed before judging the full consequences of consolidation. The scale economies for BOS cost could prove a minor factor.

EFFICIENCY OF INDIVIDUAL BASES

Are some naval bases currently spending too much on BOS? As discussed earlier, a complete answer to this question requires knowing how BOS spending at a base contributes to readiness and retention.

It is possible, for example, that BOS spending is too low at all bases, in the sense that increased spending would bring high returns in improved readiness and retention. Whether this is the case cannot be determined without relating BOS to readiness and retention — a difficult analytical task. But, whatever total spending level the Navy chooses, there is something to be said for allocating it appropriately across installations. If some bases are spending disproportionately, their expenditures may be reasonable targets for closer study.

The regression equation is a way to determine what is "disproportionate" spending. The equation estimates the average BOS expenditures of bases, adjusted for their specific characteristics. For any given base, the "adjusted average",

or "predicted" level of BOS cost is simply found by substituting the base's characteristics (AREA, ACRE, etc.) into the regression equation.

Subtracting the "predicted" value of BOS from the "observed" value given by the actual data yields the "residual". As a final step, we express the residual as a percentage of the predicted value of BOS cost. A base with a "relative residual" of 10 percent is one that is spending 10 percent more than what the CER predicts for that base. A relative measure seems closer to the intuitive notion of efficiency: a large base with a large residual is no more or less efficient than a small base with a proportionally small residual.

Consider, for example, the Naval Support Activity at New Orleans. Table 6 lists the explanatory variables for this base, and shows the result of substituting these variables into the regression equation. The resulting value of \$24.30 million is the activity's predicted BOS cost, based on the BOS cost of the entire population of bases. Subtracting the actual value of BOS cost at NSA New Orleans yields a residual of -\$16.13 million. This base is spending 66 percent less than predicted.

Unusually large and small residuals are shown in the following tables. Those bases whose relative residual is large and positive are listed in table 7. Those with large negative values are shown in table 8.

It is especially important to be clear about the implications of this kind of analysis. It is not certain that the Bethesda Medical Center, for example, is wasting money or that NSC Oakland is letting its physical plant decay. There could be good and sufficient reasons for these disparities -- reasons other than simple misallocation of resources. There might be reporting errors in the data. A base that is spending less than predicted might be receiving some unreimbursed BOS services from another base. A base that is spending more than predicted could be carrying out missions that are not fully captured by our explanatory variables. No statistical relationship is perfect.

Another important caveat is that as we pointed out earlier, we lack measures of the output of BOS spending: readiness to perform missions, and retention of personnel. This means that even aside from the above factors, we cannot make judgment about the "efficiency" of resource allocation at bases.

Our analysis, therefore, only suggests that the Navy should take a more detailed look at such bases. Only where no

TABLE 6

SAMPLE RESIDUAL ANALYSIS: NSA NEW ORLEANS

Characteristics

MIL = 2139

CIV = 1894

AREA = 2579 (Thousand square feet) ACRE = 225

BTU = 349,520

BOS Cost predicted \$24.30 million^a

BOS Cost actual

\$ 8.17 million

Residual

-\$16.13 million

Relative residual -66%

a0.0405(MIL) .034(CIV) .248(AREA) .249(ACRE) .061(BTU) .155

b Residual x 100 BOS Cost predicted

TABLE 7

BASES WITH BOS SPENDING MORE THAN 50% ABOVE PREDICTED

		Relative Residual
UIC	Base	
00168	National Naval Medical	1838
00100	Center, Bethesda MD	0.6
00158	NAS, Willow Grove,	96
	Horsham, PA	83
62688	Naval Station, Norfolk, Norfolk, VA	
00389	Naval Station, Roosevelt	77
00303	Roads, Ceiba, PR	75
60191	NAS, Oceana, Virginia	75
	Beach, Virginia Naval Weapons Station,	67
60036	Concord, Concord, CA	
00314	Naval Submarine Base,	63
0.311	pearl Harbor, Honolulu, HI	57
00197	Naval Ordnance Station,	31
	Louisville, Louisville, KY NAS, Lemoore, Lemoore, CA	57
63042	NAS, Norfolk, Norfolk, VA	54
00188	Naval Training Center,	52
00247	Naval Training Contest	
	San Diego, San Diego, CA Naval Station, Pearl	51
6 5 H T 3	Harbor, Honolulu, HI	
	nar bory none	

TABLE 8

BASES WITH BOS SPENDING MORE THAN 50% BELOW PREDICTED

		Relative Residuals
UIC	Base	
00228	Naval Supply Center, Oakland, Oakland, CA	-51%
00406	Naval Supply Center, Puget Sound, Bremerton, WA	-52
5340A	Nav Pac Missile Range Facility, Kekaha, HI	~ 52
62741	Naval Supply Corps School Athens, GA	- 53
63401	Fleet ASW Training Center Lant, Norfolk, VA	~ 56
00124	Naval War College, Newport, RI	-58
62271	Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA	-60
61414	Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Norfolk, VA	-64
00205	Naval Support Activity, New Orelans, New	-66
61665	Orleans, LA Fleet Combat Training Center, PAC, San Diego, CA	-68
00849	Naval Security Group Activity, Skaggs Island,	-72
62603	Sonoma, CA Fleet and Mine Warfare Training Center,	-76
70240	Charleston, SC Naval Communication Station, San Diego, CA	-84

And the second s

"special cases" are found to exist should the Navy consider shifting BOS funds from "overspenders" to "underspenders."

This examination has already begun, and borne fruit. Working from an earlier version of this report, OP-44 discovered that the Bethesda Medical Center had been including all spending by its medical school under BOS, and the Naval Air Station at Norfolk had been including all spending by the NARF, the Safety Center, and some other tenants. Improvements in the quality of data are thus one of the consequences of cost studies such as this one.

BEST TECHNIQUE FOR COMPARING BOS SPENDING AMONG BASES

This section concerns techniques for analyzing BOS spending -in particular, for estimating what a base "should" spend for
BOS. Lacking measures of output, we have used regression
analysis to explain actual spending. The regression equation,
or CER relates BOS cost to a variety of explanatory variables
acting together. Our CER assumes that bases with more
military and civilian personnel, building area, land acreage
and energy use have higher expected, or predicted BOS cost.

It is this predicted level that serves as the measure of what a base "should" spend. Bases that spend much more than this (i.e., that have high absolute or relative residuals) are the likely candidates for budget cuts (subject, of course, to the necessary detailed examination).

The OSD analysis of BOS spending, on the other hand, focuses on the simple ratio of BOS spending per mission person (military plus civilian) as an indicator of what a base should spend. Here, it is the bases with higher than average BOS cost per mission person that are the likely candidates for budget cuts.

We recommend the regression approach. It offers three advantages over simple ratios. First, it recognizes that BOS cost might depend on more than one explanatory variable. Using "BOS cost per mission person" as the criterion for "allowed" spending implicitly assumes that the number of mission personnel is the only causative factor. The problem is not avoided by using a variety of simple ratios. Adding "BOS cost per square foot of building area" to the list does provide some information, but not in a form that adds in an obvious way to the understanding obtained from examining BOS cost per mission person: BOS cost per square foot assumes that only building area is the determining factor. We need a way of measuring the combined effect of several explanatory variables, and that is what the regression does: The number of military personnel explains part of BOS cost, building area

explains another part, and so on. No single explanatory variable is forced to account for the effects of all.

Second, the regression technique recognizes that the relationship between BOS cost and an explanatory variable need not be a proportional one. Using BOS cost per mission person as the criterion for allowed spending implicitly assumes that a one percent increase in mission personnel should lead to a one percent (strictly proportional) increase in BOS cost. The regression approach is not limited to proportional relationships.

Finally, regression offers a systematic way of making the selection of explanatory variables and functional form: It allows one to test various choices to see which ones provide the best fit with the data. The ratio of BOS cost per mission person can be subjected to statistical tests of fit, but OSD has not offered such tests as justification for using the simple ratio. And the test results are, in fact, disappointing. We tried a regression equation with mission personnel alone and found an exponential coefficient of .275 (the OSD ratio assumes 1.0) and an R² of only .26; moreover, a regression that forces a proportional relationship has an R² of only .11 (table 9).

TABLE 9 STATISTICAL TESTS OF BOS COST PER MISSION PERSON

. 275

BOS COST = 2.32 MISPERS

 \mathbb{R}^2 .26

t-statistica

BOS COST = .0037 MISPERS

 \mathbb{R}^2 .11

AThe point of this regression is that the exponent of MISPERS is not 1.0, which would indicate a proportional relationship with BOS cost. A statistical test shows that, with high confidence, the exponent is indeed different from 1.0 (t-statistic of 18.6, which implies statistical significance at better than the .01 percent level).

In summary, statistical regression techniques offer the advantages of flexibility in trying combinations of explanatory variables and functional forms, and testing them for goodness of fit at every step. BOS cost per mission person states the model by assertion. Some BOS activities are provided directly to personnel, but there's no a priori reason why the relationship should be a strictly proportional one, or why BOS cost should be related to military personnel alone. Our own CER analysis shows that BOS cost is definitely not proportional to total personnel -- mission plus BOS -- and that other variables also contribute significantly to explanation.

Note that the simple ratio of BOS cost per mission person is not even a good proxy for the regression approach. The two approaches give completely different results (figures 1 and 2): Many bases with high BOS cost per mission person have low absolute or relative residual, and many with low BOS cost per mission person have high absolute or relative residual. Over the 30 naval air stations, the correlation coefficient between the two measures is an entirely negligible .02 (the value for perfect correlation is 1.00).

MARGINAL COST OF BASE EXPANSION

So far, two features of the CER have been applied to resource allocation problems: the scale elasticity revealed the economies of scale in BOS spending, and the residuals indicated which installations spent more or less than predicted (and which therefore deserved a closer look).

The individual coefficients of the CER also have an application. Just as the scale elasticity gives the percentage increase in BOS cost due to a 1 percent increase in all the explanatory variables moving together, each coefficient (exponent) gives the percentage increase in BOS cost due to a 1 percent increase in that variable alone. The coefficient for MTL in the major regression, for example, indicates that a 1 percent increase in the number of military personnel yields a .034 percent increase in BOS cost (holding the other explanatory variables constant).

This relationship can be used to estimate the marginal BOS cost associated with an increase in military personnel at a particular base. Take NAS Alameda, for example. The 1980 DBFR lists 4882 for the number of military personnel and \$42.2 million for BOS cost. A 1 percent increase in military personnel (49 men) should lead to a .034 percent increase in BOS cost (\$14,348). The marginal cost is therefore \$293 per man.




FIG. 1: RESIDUAL vs. RATIO MEASURE OF BOS SPENDING (30 NAVAL AIR STATIONS)




FIG. 2: RELATIVE RESIDUAL vs. RATIO MEASURE OF BOS SPENDING (30 NAVAL AIR STATIONS)

Marginal costs associated with the other explanatory variables can be derived in the same way. These factors might be useful in planning changes to the Navy shore structure -- provided, of course, that these changes are expressed in terms of the resource variables that appear in the CER. (A change will typically involve more than one explanatory variable; the marginal cost calculation will account for all.)

Suppose, however, that an anticipated change in the Navy base structure is not expressed in terms of these resource variables. The Navy might be planning to expand a NARF, for example, and may want a more refined estimate of the marginal cost of additional area of this sort, rather than relying on a general estimate based on a composite for all types of structures (i.e., the AREA variable used in this analysis). To estimate this marginal cost, one could simply construct a new list of explanatory variables that includes the new one and any others that appeared useful as control variables. (The coefficient of an explanatory variables measures the effect of that variable on the dependent variable holding all other explanatory variables constant.)

As another application, the explanatory variables need not be limited to resources such as people and area, but could be operational variables such as the ships and aircraft that create the ultimate demand for resources at naval bases and air stations. (The number of students is the operational variable that generates the need for resources at training installations, the number of beds generates the need for resources at hospitals, etc.). Force level studies typically require estimates of the total marginal cost of ships and aircraft, and one component of these total marginal costs is the BOS cost that bases spend in supporting those ships and aircrait. These marginal costs can be estimated using the above techniques. The analyst first selects some characteristics of ships and aircraft that appear related to BOS cost: the empty weight, thrust, or spotting factor of aircraft, and the displacement and shaft horsepower of ships. One could also include the size of crew. Control variables would then be selected and the resulting regression would be estimated. The coefficients of the equation (CER) would yield the cost per ton of ship displacement or per shipboard person, and the cost per pound of aircraft weight or per aircraft crewman. The marginal cost associated with a given ship or aircraft can then be determined by noting the displacement, empty weight, crew size, etc., for the ship or aircraft being considered.

Some estimates of this sort were carried out and compared with the estimates given in the Navy Program Factors Manual. In general, the regression, or CER approach gave much higher cost estimates for aircraft and somewhat lower estimates for ships. Work on this "offshoot" of the study is still continuing, and the results will be reported separately.

REPORTING SYSTEMS

The next issue concerns the efficiency of our reporting systems. Does the DBFR add anything to the information already available in Washington? Could the number of variables be reduced to ease the reporting burden on the Navy without lowering the quality of decision making?

Uniqueness of the DBFR

Our analysis suggests that the DBFR is, indeed, unique. The high "goodness of fit" achieved by the CER appears directly related to the comprehensiveness and comparability of the DBFR data. In reporting BOS cost, host commands were asked by the OSD instructions to include not only their own spending, but also BOS spending by all the tenant commands at the base. OP-44 (Shore Activities Planning and Programming Division) deserves the credit for ensuring that the Navy's bases followed this guidance.

Different Navy tenants at a given base can receive BOS funds through different claimants. Some tenants belong to different Services, and their BOS funds are thus not listed in Navy budget accounts. The DBFR is the only system we are aware of that reports total BOS cost on a functional basis -- by installation.

The DBFR also takes a comprehensive view in reporting the manpower and physical predictors of BOS cost. OP-44 ensures that bases report total military personnel, for all Services. Navy personnel assigned to ships and aircraft are included because the base must provide BOS services when the ships and aircraft are physically at the base. Moreover, ships and aircraft (and their personnel) are reported at the bases that actually provide the BOS services. Other reporting systems, such as the Force Distribution Report, list ships by homeport, even if the ships are regularly assigned to tie up elsewhere when in port. For example, two CVs homeported at Naval Station, San Diego normally tie up at Naval Air Station, North Island.

The DBFR thus keeps more complete track of resources, and a more comparable track of BOS cost and its personnel and physical determinants. The proof of the pudding is that we obtained poorer statistical results when we used variables reported by the FDR, rather than by the DBFR.

Level of Detail

The DBFR thus appears to be a worthwhile system for BOS reporting. But it is "overkill." It asks for roughly 100 separate pieces of data, far more than the five variables (number of military personnel, area, etc.) needed for a good aggregate model of BOS cost. As mentioned above, these five variables are able to account for the effect on BOS cost of detailed personnel variables like the numbers of military dependents, retirees, and reserves, and the number of civilians assigned to NARFs and to research laboratories. We also did not need operational variables like the number of aircraft at air stations, the total displacement of ships homeported at naval stations, the number of faculty at training installations, and the number of beds at hospitels. These operational variables are necessary, however, in order to make estimates of marginal cost for use in force level studies, as described earlier.

Our analysis is not definitive enough to suggest collecting the five resource variables plus the operational variables and no others. Different kinds of analysis require different variables. Our analysis does suggest, however that the full DBFR imposes a reporting burden that exceeds the value obtained.

ROBUSTNESS OF THE STUDY FINDINGS

The findings of this study are no more valid than the regression equation on which they are based. This section examines the stability of the regression results to changes in explanatory variables, functional form, and year of the data.

Tables 10 and 11 show the pattern of relative residuals caused by changes in explanatory variables and functional forms. (The relative residuals are an important output of the study, and one that is especially sensitive to these changes: residuals could easily change even if the scale elasticity did not.)

In both tables, regression I is the one derived earlier and shown in tables 4 and 5^{1} . In regression II, the dependent and explanatory variables are entered in the linear form. Equations II(and IV use a somewhat different set of explanatory variables - those that yielded the best fit on purely statistical grounds. (Resource and operational variables are mixed in this "best set," and this creates problems of interpretation.) Regression III uses the exponential form (just like regression I) and IV the linear form (just like regression II).

Tables 10 and 11 show that bases with large relative residuals (positive and negative) using regression I also have large relative residuals (positive and negative) using the alternate regressions. In other words, the pattern of residuals is stable and we thus have more confidence that our findings are not accidents of analytical technique.

Another check on the regression equation is to see if it yields stable predictions over time. If it does, we can have greater confidence in the scale elasticity shown in table 4, and in using the equation for residual analysis in the future. Data from the 1980 DBFR became available toward the end of the study, and we used it to re-estimate the regression equation (table 12). (The same explanatory variables and functional form were used, but the coefficients were re-calculated with the later data.) Several of the coefficients changed somewhat, and the level of statistical significance for the number of military personnel fell substantially. However, the other levels of statistical significance and the value of R² remained high. The scale elasticity changed little in practical terms: Combining two naval air stations would save 20 percent on BOS cost (1980 data) rather than 15 percent (1979)

The three equations for the three categories of bases come from a single regression that includes dummy variables.

TABLE 10

STABILITY OF RELATIVE RESIDUALS:
BASES SPENDING MORE THAN 50% ABOVE PREDICTED

		Relative	Residuals	for	Regressions:
UIC	Base	Ī	II	III	IV
00168	National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda MD	183%	198%	150%	84%
00158	NAS, Willow Grove, Horsham, PA	96	103	70	68
6 2 6 8 8	Naval Station, Norfolk, Norfolk, VA	83	39	85	37
00389	Naval Station, Roosevelt Roads, Ceiba, PR	77	108	74	130
60191	NAS, Oceana, Virginia Beach, Virginia	75	40	49	10
60036	Naval Weapons Station, Concord, Concord, CA	67	86	104	158
00314	Naval Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, HI	63	52	61	63
00197	Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville, Louisville, KY	57	40	46	46
63042	NAS, Lemoore, Lemoore, CA	57	79	39	45
00188	NAS, Norfolk, Norfolk, VA	54	54	27	52
00247	Naval Training Center, San Diego, San Diego, CA	52	54	75	82
62813	Naval Station, Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, HI	51	63	46	57

TABLE 11

STABILITY OF RELATIVE RESIDUALS:
BASES SPENDING MORE THAN 50% BELOW PREDICTED

		Relative	Residuals	for Regre	ssions:
UIC	Base	Ī	<u> I I</u>	III	17
00228	Naval Supply Center, Oakland, Oakland, CA	-51%	-48%	-48%	-52%
00406	Naval Supply Center, Puget Sound, Bremerton, WA	-52%	-56%	-50%	-52%
5340A	Nav Pac Missile Range Facility, Kekaha, HI	-52%	-61%	-46%	-53%
62741	Naval Supply Corps School Athens, GA	-53%	-77%	-48%	-71%
63401	Fleet ASW Training Center Lant, Norfolk, VA	-56%	-91%	-478	-88%
00124	Naval War College, Newport, RI	-58%	-75%	-55%	-69%
62271	Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA	-60%	-57%	-53%	-46%
61414	Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Norfolk, VA	-64%	-448	-62%	-45%
00205	Naval Suport Activity, New Orleans, New Orleans, LA	-66%	-67%	-62%	 58%
61665	Fleet Combat Training Center, PAC, San Diego, CA	-68%	-81%	-63%	-75%
00849	Naval Security Group Activity, Skaggs Island,	-72%	-83%	-71%	- 80 %
62603	Sonoma, CA Fleet and Mine Warfare Training Center,	-76%	-96%	-73%	-94%
70240	Charleston, SC Naval Communication Station, San Diego, CA	-84%	-95%	-83#	-94%

TABLE 12

COMPARISON OF REGRESSIONS USING 1979 AND 1980 DBFR DATA

	1979 Data ^a	1980 Data
Coefficient (Level of Statistical Significance)		
MIL	.036 (6.9%)	.030 (24%)
CIV	.247 (.02%)	.272 (.01%)
AREA	.253 (.01%)	.205 (.10%)
ACRE	.061 (.05%)	.070 (.10%)
บาห	.156 (.01%)	.116 (.31%)
Scale Elasticity	.75	.69
R ²	.90	.85

AThese coefficients are slightly different from those shown in table 4 because two bases had to be deleted from the 1979 list in order to compare results with 1980 (one 1979 base was closed, and one was made a tenant of another.)

data). More importantly, the list of bases with especially high and especially low relative residuals shows considerable stability from one year to the other (see page A-1, second paragraph).

APPENDIX A

INPUTS AND SELECTED OUTPUTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS

APPENDIX A

INPUTS AND SELECTED OUTPUTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Tables A-1 and A-2 define and list the data used to derive the regression equation discussed in the text. Table A-2 also presents some statistics generated by the regression. Except where noted, the data are from the 1979 DBFR (the listing is a computer printout that gives more digits than needed.) There is no value of "relative residual (1980)" for two bases, UICs 70024 and 00743. One was closed in 1980, and one was made a tenant of another host.

An impression of the stability of the results can be obtained from table A-3. In this table, the observations are ordered by the value of the relative residual in 1979. The first page of the table shows that those bases with large positive relative residuals in 1979 also tend to have large positive relative residuals in 1980. The third page of the table illustrates a similar point for negative relative residuals.

Table A-4 lists the correlations among the variables used in the central regression.

TABLE A-1

DESCRIPTIONS OF VARIABLES

Abbreviation	Description
UIC MIL CIV AREA ACRE	Uniform Installation Code The number of active military personnel The number of civilian personnel Building area in square feet Total land area in acres
BTU BOS COST ACTUAL	Energy consumption in BTUs BOS Cost actually spent, in millions of 1979 dollars
BOS COST PREDICTED	BOS cost predicted from regression equation, in millions of 1979 dollars
ABSOLUTE RESIDUAL	= (BOS COST ACTUAL) - (BOS COST PREDICTED)
RELATIVE RESIDUAL	ABSOLUTE RESIDUAL BOS COST PREDICTED
RELATIVE RESIDUAL	(1980) = Same as relative residual, but using 1980 data

NAVAL AIR STATIONS

	UIC	F05. C051	MIL	CIV	AREA	ACRE	D14
Manager and State of the State	138	368.96	7260	5837	7522	3200	1330830.6
10 Hall	207	46.399	8559	4538	7012	4614	1275519.6
10.00	213	32.19?	1547	629	5742	5247	296600.8
16031	236	42.191	4862	7051	8645	2697	2525348.2
10 CE	246	141.740	22770	9310	41086	46631	362351.4
00 100	296	38.422	5110	2437	3321	3909	397968.8
COUNTY CO MICH MORE IN THE COUNTY A	334	23.541	3270	400	2363	32779	84377.8
HE GREET	389	64.372	3123	1295	6249	36861	277079.0
THE PROPERTY OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF THE	426	51.139	6577	686	4353	71042	695751.6
100 Metal	28099	24.575	3213	210	2476	7259	238699.2
2	66191	56.294	9028	926	3924	8872	631466.4
7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	60269	32,714	7709	727	2930	20048	387191.0
111111111111111111111111111111111111111	66259	33.462	10256	1041	3692	22872	471401.8
	60462	19.538	1655	164	2643	53+48	696102.6
Í	60495	16.796	1119	276	1270	152304	66702.6
	63042	56.275	4550	904	4679	39173	649732.6
5 (404	7.562	377	193	1220	621711	68071.2
֓֞֓֞֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓	101	10.596	2667	248	966	2320	174444.8
STREET STREET	153	29.713	875	980	351	853	208815.6
FA MAST	196	7.917	いかい	141	387	163	45671.4
6A R53,	206	12.758	1010	486	1275	4924	125454.6
COCCOS IN MICH FED UNITERNA	215	12.519	1058	529	417	795	141124.2
1 X 1655	275	11.241	477	293	1283	1285	382651.2
11 F:55	204	62.564	5020	9209	5864	2869	1315619.8
	216	57.644	2229	4354	5954	4373	1249846.0
TX NASS	629	35.206	3126	1278	6121	3498	1411224.6
GOODS IN THE TAXABLE CONTRACTOR	60241	13.566	1648	192	1564	5582	162257.8
<u>-</u>	60376	14.049	1542	528	1601	EE96	170593.4
Ξ,	80209	14.713	2080	496	2079	11029	338383.0
<u>.</u> ;	63043	13.683	1444	448	2002	13495	268953.2
63643 BS REST DERIBINE							

TABLE A-2 (Cont'd)

NAVAL ATR STATIONS

	BOS COST ACTISAL (1979)	BOS COST PREDICTED (1979	ABSOLUTE - KESIDUAL (1979)	RELATIVE RESIDUAL (1979)	RELATIVE RESIBUAL (1980)
00150 VA MAS, MODITORY 00107 F1 MAS, JACKSDAVILLE 00174 F1 MAS, MAY WEST 00074 F1 MAS, MAY WEST 00074 F1 MAS, MAY WEST 00074 F1 MAS, MATHETER FOLM 00070 F1 MAS, MATHETER FOLM 00070 MA MAS, MATHETER FOLM 00070 MA MAS, WITHER TSLAM 00070 MA MAS, WITHER TSLAM 00070 MA MAS, WITHER TSLAM 00070 MAS, MAS, WITHER MAS 00070 MAS, MAS, MASHAN 0010 MA MAS, MASHAN 00150 FA MAS, MASHAN 00150 FA MAS, MASHAN 00150 FA MAS, MISHAN	96.895 46.3995 42.199 42.191 38.740 33.542 51.139 51.139 51.139 51.139 7.525 7.527 7.527 7.917 10.590 11.241 62.564 13.666	63.018596 59.571587 26.215548 73.675114 105.118444 36.3296131 36.329608 38.22.955695 32.955695 32.955695 33.204343 20.075398 11.916175 15.126823 15.466739 11.916175 15.466739 11.916175 15.466739 16.466359 17.466739 18.466359 18.466939 19.46675	33.8764042 5.9834517 -31.4841136 33.6215559 4.8168687 4.8168687 4.8168687 4.8168687 4.8168687 0.1976568 0.1976564 0.1976564 0.1976564 -1.3261752	0.55343024 0.26433544 0.26433544 0.31201878 0.14912403 0.31200818 0.79985976 0.78523237 0.78523237 0.28663248 0.02866927 0.02866927 0.02866927 0.02866927 0.02866927 0.02866927 0.02866927 0.02866927 0.02866927 0.02866927 0.0286693 0.028693 0.028693 0.028693 0.028693 0.028693 0.028693 0.028693	0.77159242 0.09828845 0.32208142 -0.39596919 -0.216265583 0.21824360 0.7246819 0.7246819 0.1446687 0.18738921 0.18738921 0.18738921 0.2112777 2.05609745 0.08609745 0.08609745 0.08609745 0.08609745 0.08609745 0.08609745 0.08609745 0.08609745 0.08609745 0.08609745 0.08609745 0.08609745 0.08609745 0.08609745 0.08609745 0.08609745 0.08609745 0.08609745
KOTZK IX MAD: CUMDE FIELD KREAD FL WHITHD FIELD KREAB MO NAS: MERIDIAN	14.713	17.303225 20.544239 19.353701	-3.2542250 -5.8312391 -5.6707014	-0.13027774 -0.23516272 -0.24133375	-6.19985859 -6.15339958 -6.34057294

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	1868402.6 7779981.4 80762.8 712107.6 223598.0 1327612.4 155694.6 674912.8 1811443.0
ACRE	1136 1164 103 3515 1155 11813 4644 1450 838
AKEA	5536 4296 1671 1880 2847 1245 1694 3435 4162
CIV	1081 2756 285 742 11792 856 1787 1537
# IF	11524 44155 2503 12895 12895 20911 6963 2970 38508 11829 5882
UIC BOS COST	129 21.923 245 88.704 314 19.554 60201 31.184 61145 51.710 61414 17.762 62021 18.030 62638 91.241 62813 54.917 63406 6.613
	00129 CT MAVAL SUE BASE, NEW LGNBON 00135 CA NAVAL STATION, SAN DIEGO 06314 HI NAVAL SUE RASE, PEARL HARBOR 60215 FL NAVAL STATION, HAPFORT 61165 SC MAVAL STATION, CHARLESTON 61414 VA NAVAL AMPHIB BASE, LITTLE CREEK 62021 CA NAVAL AHFHIB BASE, LITTLE CREEK 62031 HI NAVAL STATION, NORFOLK 62313 HI NAVAL STATION, PEARL HARBOR 63406 CA NAV SUB SUPPORT FAC, SAN DIEGO

PUBLIC WARK CENTERS

. BTU	474906.4 349065.0 60918.0 469888.0 3568283.2 651476.0
ACRE	474 2116 1518 540 297 696
AREA	4394 10999 8068 3501 1556
CIO	1843 1558 675 666 797 1117
MIL	<u> </u>
1503 S08 JIN	187 24.389 62755 40.306 63387 27.886 65113 14.240 1LA 65114 14.918 6837E 33.721
	601S7 VA HAV FUBLIC WAS CTK, ROBFOLK 62755 HI BAV FUR WAS CTK, FEAKL HARBOR 23397 CA HAV FUBLIC WAS CTR, SAN DIEGO 65113 IL HAV FUBLIC WAS CTR, FENSACOLA 65178 EA HAV FUBLIC WAS CTR, FENSACOLA 65378 EA HAV FUBLIC WAS CTR, S FRAN

HAVAL STATIONS

FELATIVE RESITUAL (1990)	-0.01617858 0.4024599 0.50896296 -0.14944556 -0.36172474 -0.29174909 -0.49088431 0.43407582 0.52162342
RELATIVE RESIDUAL (1979)	51.675346 -19.7523457 -0.36288767 -0.01617858 33.916247
ARSBLUTE RESITUAL (1979)	4.7523457 4.7737533 7.4816573 -2.3321292 -9.9379167 -31.3085383 -2.0635870 41.403879 18.6478503
POS COST ARSDLUTE PREMICIEN RESIDUAL (1979) (1979)	
BOS COST ACTUAL (1979)	31.923 83.764 19.354 31.134 51.762 17.762 19.930 91.241 54.917
	00129 CT NAUGE OF C. NEW LINNOW 00024 CA NAUGE CIATION. SAN BIFGS 00014 HI NAUAL SHEEPAF. FEACH HARBING 60011 FL NAUAL STATION. MAYFART 41145 SC NAUAL STATION. CHARLESTON 61011 CA NAUAL AMPHIE BAST. LITTLE CREEK 62021 CA NAUAL AMPHIE BAST. CHRICAD 62689 VA NAUAL STATION. PEARL HARBOR 6268 VA NAUAL STATION. PEARL HARBOR 62696 CA NAU SUR SUFFORT FAC. SAN BIFGS

PHIBLIC MARK CENTERS

RELATIVE RESIDUAL (1980)	0.15510682 -0.33439408 2.87141763 -0.19704267 6.40853482 0.79396639
RELATIVE RESIDUAL (1979)	-0.6420446 0.01430646 0.15516482 8.6144201 0.30337459 -0.33439408 3.6253621 0.19065295 2.87141763 -4.2164642 -0.17400452 -0.19704267 -5.7458005 -0.22966736 0.40853482 4.3559393 0.18239156 0.79396639
ABSGLUTE RESIBUAL (1973)	-0.6420446 8.6144201 3.6253621 -4.2104642 -5.7458005 4.3559393
BOS COST PEE BIG (F) (1979)	25.031045 31.691530 24.260638 18.450454 20.663800
KAS CAST ACTUAL (1979)	24.389 40.306 27.886 14.240 14.918
	ACTOR ON MAY FIRST TO WES CITE, MODEDS NO ACTOR STANDING ACTOR TO THE STANDING ACTOR TO THE STANDING ACTOR TO SANDING ACTOR TO SANDING ACTOR TO MAY FIRST SANDIA OF THE SANDIA ACTOR ON MAY FIRST OF THE SANDIA ACTOR ON MAY FIRST OF THE SANDIA ACTOR ON MAY FIRST OF WES CITE, OF FRAN

ERS	AREACRE	7	4356 42 1 325 32	7 6	247	9611	1410 24	75	333	3/1	28	1147	A25	400	201	798	361		TRATETIES LEAVE TO THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERT	014	AREA	נות	- 1557653.4	276.3 7730 108	205 4538 000	200 1486 1050	128 A35 Q1 3	620 207 10	10 149 2298 1	1507 8555 473 1		19 101	8907 2533	1977 000 22	200 5312 1747	1907	742 293 383	288 30	24				
MEDITAL CENTERS	3 -11H 1503 300 1	are says con	2391	88 722 453	203 4776 2274	285 5.552 478	6112 613-64 20009	66818 14.327 2033	\$ 0.00°		3.894		869.6	6.152	19094 9.772	5000 3.421 50055 3.421	869.01 6089	68101				AIR TOUR ALL	11C 802 C12.		67. 360	74.864	247 35.254 3	233	2.046	50465	24.61 28.911	7.040	63322 1.139	63401 0.003	65928 28-984	124 2.044	161 32.133	62272 0.5.4	COL 147CO	64356	39		
	•				STO SEE LINE	I I Can at a	CHE PERSON NEEDS	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	200	THE WAY RES HER CINE	CA HAU KEG MEN CTAY	ACT NOT REG WER THE	EL HAU KEC HEL CIK	HAV SEG FEET CIRE	CA NAU REG ASE CIR.	11. KAN KEU NED CTR.	MC NAV KEU HER CTR.	CA POST NEW TEST	TA MAU REG HER	CA NGU FEG NEW							09V3III N CHICVEO	JAVAN 11 AGVAL	Tener v	TEEF	3			4	7	3C FR. 3U	CA PEER	150.04 15	THE PERSON IN	ME US THE	TUR MANY	SA UN ARMED	;

TABLE A-2 (Cont'd)

MEDICAL CENTERS

NOTED HE HATTREAM HAVAL HETE CTE. COCOST EL HAN GERN & REG HETE CTES. FOREACRIA GOCOST EL HAN GER HETE CTES. GREE HIRESTE GARGE CA HAN GER HETE CTES. FOREACHING GARGE CA HAN GER HETE CTES. SAN BITCOM GARGE RE HAN GER HETE CTES. CAN BITCOM GARGE EL HAN GER HETE CTES. CAN BITCOM GARGE EL HAN GER HETE CTES. CAN BITCOM GARGE EL HAN GER HETE CTES. LONG BEACH GARGE TE HAN GER HETE CTES. LONG BEACH GARGE TE HAN GER HETE CTES. CAN LEJUNE GARGE CA HAN GER HETE CTES. CANCEN GARGE HETE CTES. CANCENTON GARGE HETE CTES. CANCENTON GARGE HETE CTES. CANCENTON GARGE HETE CTES. PUELABELFHIA	805 C051 ACTUM. (1977) 88.729 4.722 2.576 2.576 2.576 2.576 7.702 3.894 6.192 9.772 9.698 9.772	POS COST (19/9) (19/9) (19/9) 31.341429 6.269134 3.689862 4.533249 16.24139 5.2281355 8.646466 7.224139 7.7224139 10.225562 7.752477 10.065390 4.963339 12.658655 10.840626	FE RESIDUAL (1979) 19 57.3875706 1 19 57.3875706 1 10 -1.4871338 -1.3138623 -1.3138623 -1.5138623 -1.5138623 -1.5138623 -1.5138623 -1.5138623 -1.51378 -1.5604770 -1.560470 -1.5604	FELATIVE #1979) #251644 #255174 #2525174 #25265070	KELATIUE KESIUM. (1990) 3.69655689 6.44141693 -0.07709747 -0.07709747 -0.07709747 -0.07709747 -0.07709747 -0.07709747 -0.0770947 -0.077097 -0.077097 -0.077097 -0.077097 -0.077097 -0.077097 -0.077097 -0.077097 -0.077097 -0.077097 -0.077097 -0.077097 -0.077097 -0.077097 -0.077097 -0.077097 -0.077097 -0.077097 -0.077097
COCYO TI MAUM, THE CTR. M. CUTCATB COCA? CA MAUM, THE CTR. M. CUTCATB COCA! OF FET COMBAT TEMS CTR. LANT CALLS CA FET COMBAT TEMS CTR. FAC CALLS CA FET COMBAT TEMS CTR. FAC CALLS CA FET COMBAT TEMBER TRACETR CALLS CA FET FORBAT TEMBER TRACETR CALLS CA FET FORBAT TEMBER TRACETR CALLS CA FET FOR THAN CTR. CORRY CALLS CA MAUM FACILITY OF CORTER. CRATE CALLS CA MAUM. MATCHER CENTER. CR. CMD CALLS CA MAUM. MATCHER CALLS CALLS CA MAUM. CONTENT CONTENT CALLS CA MAUM. MATCHER CONTENT CALLS CA MAUM. MATCHER CONTENT CALLS CALLED CALLS CALLED CAL	805 COST ACT.M. (1979) 53.360 36.864 10.255 5.516 2.330 28.911 7.060 1.159 0.683 26.984 2.311 32.155 8.194 1.864	PRICE FOR THE	AESOLUTE (1979) 12.7963532 12.5596920 -9.8681881 0.6315816 -4.3122652 -1.072652 -1.072652 -2.1606972 -0.9710816 -0.9710816 -0.9710816 -0.9710816 -1.312652 -1.31262	PELATIVE RESIBUIL (1979) 0.34011619 0.55791311 0.3404205 0.31404305 0.32140305 0.32140305 0.04273635 0.08720509 0.0872093 0.0872093 0.08720304 0.0872093 0.0872093 0.0872093 0.08720304	RELATIVE (1980) 0.39328257 0.63679504 0.27614284 0.28939258 0.4668941 0.53679610 0.05574623 0.19042535 0.19042525 0.33433649 0.33433649

A-7

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HAUNE SLATE STATERAS	COST HIL CIV AREA ACRE DIV	40.143 1103 1826 3120 10038 664466.6 664466.6 62509 6255 3331 554657.8 57 525 2252 2265 2672 451380.0 57.34 485 3732 10596 16589 587477.4 485 3732 10596 16589 587477.4 56.746 57.34 1369 587416.2 56.776 57.34 10199 1095 1055 185213.0 56.461 61 493 1092 1092 1095 1055 185213.0 56.461 61 493 1092 1092 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095	UIC BOS COST MIL CIV AREA ACRE BTU	102 25.713 996 7859 3529 286 1696548. 151 66.741 296 3741350. 151 66.741 296 3741350. 181 64.735 784 12382 3659 1906 1885877. 181 64.135 110 7861 2905 1906 1687534. 221 105.156 2300 9850 16451 2020 1926911. 221 105.156 2917 10812 3452 196335. 251 76.972 345 6470 3421 350 1216356. 331 39.570 51 7382 2211 350 1216356. 60258 49.573 51 7382 2211 350 1216356.
	1503 S08 318	109 30-109 UA HAVAL WESFUHS SIA, YORFIGUR 30-104 IN HAV WEARS SUPEDS! CIR. CRANE 30-104 IN HAV WEARS SUPEDS! INDIAN HEAD 30-105 VE HAVAL SUFFLY CIR, NORFOLK 30-105 VE HAVAL WEAFONS SIA, LOUISVILLE 30-107 KT HAVAL WEAFONS SIA, DANIES SOUND 30-208 CA MINAL SUFFLY CIR, PRISE SOUND 30-30-4 LN HAVAL SUFFLY CIR, PRISE SOUND 30-30-4 HN HAVAL SUFFLY CIR, CHARLESTON 30-30-5 CA HAVAL WEAFONS SIA, EARL 30-30-5 CA HAVAL WEAFONS SIA, SEAL BEACH 30-30-5 CA HAVAL WEAFONS SIA, SEAL BEACH 30-30-5 CA HAVAL WEAFONS SIA, SEAL BEACH 30-30-7 HI MAVAL WEAFONS SIA, SEAL BEACH 30-30-30-30-30-30-30-30-30-30-30-30-30-3	iu ·	COLCE RF PORTSROUTH NAVAL SHIFYARD COTST FO FRILABELFHIA HAVAL SHIFYARD COTST ON HOSFOLK HAVAL SHIFYARD COTST CHARLESTUR HAVAL SHIFYARD COTT CA HARE ISLAHD SAIFYARD COTT CA HARE ISLAHD SAIFYARD COTT CA HARE ISLAHD SAIFYARD COTT HE PEAKL HARBOR HAVAL SHIFYARD COTT HI PEAKL HARBOR HAVAL SHIFYARD COTT HI PEAKL HARBOR HAVAL SHIFYARD

INUM SIPPLY STATICE

	BOS COST ACTUAL (1979)	Previous	ABSOLUTE Residual (1979)	RELATIVE RESIDUAL (1979)	relative restrual (1980)
estos un haune ufartes sta. Yenstrum	40.143	32,638530		7.5644760 0.26056535 0.16299693	6.16299693
DOTAL THE BAU BY ATAMES THE SORT STR. STANK	28.675	45.766449	7	-0.35159925	-0.39795472
	31,274	35,788248	-4.5142479	-4.5142479 -0.09819559 -0.26913136	-0.26913136
Ş	29.148	46.744349	46.744349 -17.5963495 ~0.35504504 -0.37895107	-0.35504504	-0.37895107
OOT 97 ST MAUNI STAFFORS STAF CHANGESTON	34.892	35.573546	35,573546 -6.6815460 0.00895199 -0.63294503	0.00895199	-0.63294503
CO197 KY MAU ORDHANIC CIA. LONICALLE	26.796	17.064152	9.7318483	0.62891191	0.00387894
S	20.463	41,702716	7	-0.48533328	-0.55321396
	18.641	13.750934		4.8900655 0.42833929	0.41673447
TO NOOVE	4.733	9.852261	-5.1192605	-5.1192605 -0.41816309 -0.52692135	-0.52692135
HI HAUAR	8.028	14.421690		-6.3936964 -0.37399849 -0.35253198	-0.35253198
SE BAUAI	9.286	11.998507		-2.7125075 -0.14272671 -0.23968674	-0.23963674
CA WAUAL	33.116	19.853405		13.2625954 0.71839545 0.68118603	50931189.0
N. PAUAL	13.988	17.594797	-3.6067968	-3.6067968 -0.14815726 -0.43103779	-0.43163779
	20.646	28.078520	-7.4325197	-7.4325197 -0.22909041 -0.2242/445	-0.2242/445
5	6.169	9.821190	9.821190 -3.6521895 -0.27004769 -0.36474693	-0.27004769	-0.36474673

CHIPYARR

Relative Resibual (1930)	-0.30737758 -0.08188281 -0.3680733 0.42537280 0.19595670 0.19595670 0.42750113 0.56634539
RELATIVE RESIDUAL (1979)	47.214665 -21.5016652 -0.43422246 -0.30737758 67.069314 -6.3283141 -0.07944489 -0.08188281 77.273181 -22.9061815 -0.28349009 -0.36680733 47.594109 16.5408906 0.36855171 0.42537280 80.543049 24.6129506 0.31800324 0.19595670 65.845577 11.1264233 0.18416458 0.42750113 29.654269 13.5795005 0.40505927 0.21030695
ABSOLUTE RESIDUAL (1979)	-21.5016652 -6.3283141 -22.9061815 16.5408906 24.6129506 11.1264233 9.9157341
80S COST FREDICIED (1979)	47.214665 67.069314 77.273181 47.594109 80.543049 65.845577 29.654264 35.993499
BOS COST ACTUAL (1979)	25.713 60.741 54.367 64.135 105.156 76.972 39.570 49.573
	ACTOR WILPOSTEMBITH MAUAL SHIFYARD COTST DA BUTTOR MAUAL SHIFYARD COTOR OF BUTTOR MAUAL SHIFYARD COTOR EA BUTTOR MAUAL SHIFYARD COTOR WART SOUND MAUAL SHIFYARD COTOR WARTHER SOUND MAUAL SHIFYARD COTOR HILL FEAST MAUAL SHIFYARD COTORS EA LONG NEASH MAUAL SHIFYARD

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		MAN	MOUNT CHEFTER ALLEGE TO SEE		AREA	ACKE	UT#	
	DIC 805 COST	TS03	HIL	113				
LA HRUG CA HRUG HY NEUR	265 255 60028 61174 61189	8.168 5.570 26.824 18.382 12.152 24.361	2139 1630 1214 2296 4795 1442	1894 738 606 482 1277 457	2579 2021 2985 2018 3393 3640	225 271 1087 133 522 1154	349522.8 228271.6 516057.8 310836.0 228486.8 296047.4	
63313 CA NAV SUPPORT ALI' L'OS TILLOS		858	S HOW	TESTI	RESEARCH & TESTING CENTERS	ς,		
	UIC 1	1502. SOR 31N	HIL	C10	AREA	ACRE	PTU.	
COLGA IR MAUAL AUTOMICS CENTER COLGA NO DE TAYLOR MAN SHIP RED CTR COLTA DE HAVAL RESEARCH LEBORATORY OOLTA DE HAVAL RESEARCH LEBORATORY COCASA UN HAVOL SUPEACE MERFORE ENGR STA COCASA UN HAVO UNINERSEA MARFARE ENGR STA COCASA DE HAVO COCASTAL SYSTEMS CTR, UH DAN COCASTAL RED CENTER, ANDADOLIS SISTA HO MAVAL OCCASTAL SYSTEMS LABORATORIS COCASA EL HAVAL UNDERWATER SYST CTR COCASA EL HAVAL UNDERWATER SYST CTR COCASA HI HAVAL HIR TEST CTR, CHITAR LENGLE COCASA HI HAVAL MERFORMSTORY CENTER COCASA HI HAVAL MERFORMSTORY CON MAN MAN ATRE ENGLISHER COCASA HI HAVAL MERFORMSTORY CON MAN MAN ATRE ENGLISHER COCASA HI HAVAL MERFORMSTORY CON MAN MAN ATRE ENGLISHER COCASA HI HAVAL MERFORMSTORY CON MAN MAN ATRE ENGLISHER COCASA HI HAVAL MERFORMSTORY CON MAN MAN ATRE ENGLISHER COCASA HI HAVAL MERFORMSTORY CON MAN ATRE ENGLISHER COCASA HI HAVAL MERFORMSTORY CON MAN ATRE ENGLISHER COCASA TORY COCASA	163 123 173 173 173 253 60921 66504 66604 421 1609 60536 60536 60536 60536 60536 60536 60536	15.98 18.31 39.561 24.707 15.835 10.011 11.158	# 13 CO 1 4 8 8 C	KAWAKA WAA 40	258 857 660 1459 481 2985 681 1361 136 1717 840 631 894 1533 1385 1250 4573 4816 416 652 4470 6529 530 570 1662 4825 1415 637	41.08 # 44.00 # 10.00	201319.8 11 218095.8 12 893954.6 22 196545.2 23 18373.8 24 18393.0 59 317480.2 115 142062.4 12 183923.0 307482.2 318 46568.8 43 345941.2 345941.2 345941.2 345941.2 34596.3 34596.3 152 132898.0	- A A M - A A A A A A A

TABLE A-2 (Cont'd)

PAVAL SHPPORT ACTIVITIES

BOS COST PREDICEED

POS COST ACTIM

RELATIUE RESIBUAL (1980)	-0.58426752 -0.55239770 -0.29461693 -0.43376257 -0.27327965
FELATIVE RESIDUAL (1979)	-0.6268669 -0.61099597 -0.27800731 0.25409436 -0.44578184
ARSOLUTE RESIDUAL (1979)	24.182361 -16.0143609 -0.62688669 -0.55426752 16.889285 -11.3192850 -0.61099597 -0.55239770 21.435935 5.3880652 0.29800731 -0.29601693 15.332716 3.0492839 0.24409436 -0.43376257 23.730727 -11.5787272 -0.44578184 -0.27327965 19.479761 4.8812386 0.30191533 -0.16195347
BOS COST PREDICIED (1979)	24.182361 16.889285 21.435935 15.332716 23.730727
ROS COST ACTUAL (1979)	9,168 5,570 26,824 18,382 12,152
	OCCCS LA MAVAL SUPPORT ACT, NEW ORLEANS OCCUS DA MAVAL SUPPORT ACT, SEATILE 6003 CA MAVAL SUPPORT ACT, TREASURE IS 61174 HY NEVAL SUPPORT ACT, ESONLYM 61167 PA MAV SUPPORT ACT, PHILADELPHIA 62311 CA MAV SUPPORT ACT, PHILADELPHIA
	ACT, ACT, ACT, ACT, T, PI
	SUPPORT SUPPORT SUPPORT SUPPORT IPPORT AC
	HAVAL HAVAL HAV SU HAV SU
	353555
	00205 00235 60023 61174 61189

RESEARCH & TESTING CONTERS

BOS COST BOS COST ARSOLUTE RELATIVE RELATIVE ACTUAL FREDICIEU RESIDUAL RESIDUAL RESIDUAL (1979) (1979) (1979)	The control of the
STEEL CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACTOR OF T	00127 IN MAUNI AUTOMICS GENTER 00127 HE DU TAYLOR MAU CHIE RED CIR 00127 HE DU TAYLOR MAU CHIE RED CIR 00127 HE HOUNI CHECKEL WARGARIUMY 00053 UN HAU CHECKEL WARGARI FUND CHR 00053 UN HAU CHECKEL WARGARI FUND CHR 00053 UN HAU CHECKEL WARGARI FUND CHR 00053 HE HAU CHECKEL WARGARI FOR HAU DAN 0117 HE HAUNI CHIE RED CHERE, ANNOHORI IS 0127 HE HAUNI HENERALIER SYSTEMS CHR 00053 HE HAUNI HENERALIER SYSTEMS CHR 00053 HE HAUNI HENERALIER GARRE FACHILITY 00053 HE HAUNI WARGARI E RABBE FACHILITY 00053 HE HAU WARGARI E RABBE FACHILITY 00053 HE HAU GENERALER

A-11

THIS PAGE IS REST QUALITY PRODUCTION.

MAVAL COMMUNICATION STATIONS

	WIC W	1503 50% 310	MIL	C1V	AKEA	ACRE	BTU
00702 HE NAU SECUEITY GF ACT, WINTER HA 00743 FR PAVAL CORH STA, FUERTO RICO 00763 ND HAVAL CORH UNIT, WASHINGTON 00849 CA HAVA CORH STA, STOCKTON 00950 HI NAVL CORH SEE STOKES TA, EPAC 62072 FL HAVAL SECURITY GROUE, HONESTEAD 53033 HE NAVAL SECURITY GROUE, AGAN 645386 AK HAVAL SECURITY GROUE, AGAN 65754 FR HAV SECURITY GROUE, AGAN 70040 CA NAVAL SECURITY STA, MASHINGTON 70240 CA NAVAL CORH STA, SARBHASTON 70240 CA NAVAL CORH STA, SARBHASTON 70272 VA NAVCOHH AREA HASTER STA, LANT	762 745 788 884 886 62842 62842 63938 64354 70092 70240	3.000 2.000 3.0000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.0	341 368 161 292 392 1136 395 250 250 246 246	68 176 45 45 201 163 61 61 75	320 592 297 173 6244 580 85 85 85 85 94 94 476	583 2520 216 3109 2769 2436 815 815 253 2251 38 622 471	62753.6 79407.2 72620.0 48841.0 60474.2 193035.8 13314.4 198501.8 108957.5 44894.0 51139.2 15122.6
			MAUAL	MAVAL FACTLITTES	ITTES		
	UIC 1	BOS COST	HIL	CIV	AREA	ACRE	BIU
S7040 DE MAUAL FACILITY, LEWES S7041 NC MAUAL FACILITY, CAPE HATTERAS S7053 CA MAUAL FACILITY, CAPE HATTERAS S7054 CA MAUAL FACILITY, PT SPUR S7055 MR MAUAL FACILITY, PACIFIT READ	57646 57641 57633 57664 57664	1.420 0.994 2.236 1.885 0.949	164 140 223 97 118	18 23 17 14 14	100 110 145 93 95	364 58 48 48 178	20587.8 33526.2 47635.0 56230.0 11963.0

MAYAL COMMENTEATING STATIONS

RESIDUAL (1950)	0.20135176		0.15580336	-6.47917979	-6.24738373	0.04368080	-6.15084760	0.31241392	0.53443627	0.43354465	0.09712497 -0.65646288	-0.11353825	-0.19693942
RELATIVE RESIDUAL (1979)	-0.3761963 6.16991337 0.20135176	-1.7191694 -0.13718927	-0.4465098 0.16343971	-2.4616853 -0.42818396	-1.3948347 -0.66165561 -G.24738373	0.1586220 0.14034754	0.23491591	-1.2068595 -0.04653905	-0.4751947 0.10714261		0.09712497	-1.4399137 -0.25577659 -0.11353825	-1.2903006 -0.07266051 -0.19693942
APSOLUTE RESIPUAL (1979)	-0.3761963	-1.7191694	-0.4465098	-2.4616853	-1.3948347	0.1586220	-0.3532239	-1.2068595	-0.4751947	0.1796870	-0.4211232	-1.4399137	
recuesco (1979)	3.671196	5.242159	3,396510	3.413585	6.402835	8.255378	2.753224	4.444860	4.898195	3.529913	5.960123	1.719914	3.995301
BOS COST ACTUM 1 (1979)	13 16 19	3.523	2.940	0.952	5.008	8.414	2.400	3,238	4.423	3.709	5.539	0.280	2.705
	AN STREET SECTION OF STREETS HAS THE COLOR	20743 FR MAYOL COME STA. PHERTO RICH	MOTOR HI MANA COMME THAT I MACHINISTIAN	ACO CA MAU SERIETY OF ACT. SKAGOS 15	ACCOUNT OF MAUDIN COMMERCENT STRUCKTINE	ACOSED BY MAN CHAM AREA MASTER STAY FEAC	COOS CL MAIN OFFIRETY CESSIP. ISSUESTED	AND AL MANA COMM INIT. CHILLE	AND AN MAINE COUNTY GOME - MINE	ANDER OF MAN STEERITY GIST. SARANA STEA	MOINTING THE CHANGE OF COACH	PAGE TA MAURI CORR STA. SAN DIEGO	70272 UN MAUCONN ANTA HASTER STA. LANT

MAUAL FACTLITIES

RELATIVE RESTOUAL (1950)	0.19182648 0.14161701 0.50444587 0.34712103 0.37393441 0.03640669 0.07871593 -0.03088770 0.16626124 0.05073949 0.19639033 0.02718555
RELATIVE RESIBUAL (1979)	0.19182648 0.59444587 0.37393441 0.07871593 0.16626124
ABSOLUTE RESIBBAL (1979)	-0.6104969 -0.3615814 -0.1192798 -0.7222382 -0.6385364
ROS COST PREDICIED (1979)	2.030497 1.245581 2.355280 2.025554 1.471238
BOS COST ACTUAL (1979)	1,420 0,904 2,236 1,185 0,949
	STORD DE MAUM, FACTITIY, ITHES STORT DE MAUM, FACTITIY, CART HATTERAS STORT CA HAUM, FAC, CENTERVILLE BEACH STORT CA HAUM FACTITIY, PT SPUR STORE OR HAUM, FACTITIY, COST HEAD STORE EA NAVAL FACTITIY, FACTITIC BEACH

TABLE A-3

COMPARISON OF RELATIVE RESIDUALS USING 1979 AND 1980 DATA

uto	RELATIVE RESIDUAL (1979)	RELATIVE RESTRICT (1980)			
168	1.85924249	7.0965960			
158	1.04936197	0.41089868			
62688	0.42474326	0.43407388			
349	0.79323254 0.76920263	0.73594819 0.64894111			
60191 60036	0.73344545	0.66118603			
314	0.70076628	0.60996296			
196	0.66645140	1.00817547			
197	0.63609147	0.00347494			
63042	0.54707741	0.80294536			
106	0.35293276	0.7/150242			
247	0.5441064	0.63679504			
62613	Q.52436587 Q.48569311	0.52162342 0.34712103			
57041 244	0.43683077	0.41673447			
60258	0.42660647	0.21030695			
63126	0.42446540	0.30533279			
61001	0.19097598	0.29838964			
311	0.30745446	0.56634539			
191	0.30534660	0.42537280			
57053	0.37157120	0.036406 69 0./2361257			
620 421	0.35561121 0.33621719	0.3061440			
948	0.33742109	0.23239258			
210	0.32524880	0.3832227			
221	0.32012697	0.19595670			
66794	0.31391107	0.41354465			
246	0.31328932	-0.22095583			
354	0.31155699	0.21824360			
61333	0.30421394	0.23951368 -0.33419408			
62755 68311	0.301349 76 0.29192305	-0.16195547			
60028	0.29010485	-0.23601693			
173	0.26062551	0.30301675			
60495	0.26923310	2.05677961			
107	0.26469259	0.16299693			
61174	0.25789995	-0.43376237			
213	0.23627961	0.32208142			
62092	0.23743163	-0.15084760 0.29935018			
60200 167	0.22969331 0.22643473	0.28994376			
68085	0.21314224	0.06972579			
163	0.20257472	C-16034362			
57056	0.19796863	0.02718955			
57040	0.19684388	0.14101701			
251	0.19294535	0.42750113			
63367	0.18365364	2.07141763			
653/6	0.17565233	0.73395639 0.05073949			
57055 60921	0.1/093765 0.167C6296	0.08596446			
DALTE	A 9 7 A L A A C 3 A	********			

RELATIVE RESTRUCT (1980)

UTG	RELATIVE RESIDUAL (1979)	Met Hiller Manifestor		
176	0.16609361	0.1 01 07659		
786	0.136/1632	0.15580336 0.20135174		
702	0.1545690 6 0.15262692	-0.04310078		
296 62269	0-1 3333757	0.14098675		
950	0.12370395	0.04368080 0.14486487		
60087	0.10673464	-0.24739297		
216 20052	0.09318649	-0.05040284		
215	0.09202360	0.53185696 0.30997097		
6 5 6 0 4	0.0924434 8 0.08956169	0.63443627		
63056	0.98653001	-0.01216297		
204 63056	0.03477079	0.03315432		
43401	0.0/994481	-0.069994 48 -0.03086770		
57054	0.0794543 8 0.07637412	-0.25304628		
68094	0.07597650	0.00915709		
61331 245	0.04759329	0.40924509 0.04265439		
6 60 92	0.04131594 0.03119768	0.18738021		
40259 187	0.01725399	0.15516662		
53462	0.01293202	0.21127777 -0.09143535		
43325	0.01025122 0.00714124	0.01614336		
68101	0.00514157	-0.07296503		
193 68095	0.00032611	0.89213011 0.04609745		
101	-0.029662 96 -0.04396160	-0.27249758		
63406	-0.04425920	-0.53679610		
62603 206	-0.04546359	-0.1:445340 -0.1:744556		
60201	-0.05275341 -0.05746794	0.0 . 143350		
623/6	-0.05785613	-0.05724133		
6838 6 63038	-0.05874935	0.31241392		
62021	-0.06213727 -0.06716963	- 0. 4 0 0 0 0 4 4 3 1 - 0 . 1 4 3 6 1 1 4 0		
68093	-0.06756602	-0.09864459		
68335 203	-0.0/126973	0.44141093		
6 80 90	-0.07448467	0,275942 11 18526160.o-		
151	-0.07622/97 -0.07918011	0.03646077		
6 8	-0.07950204	-0.01700747		
161	-0.08253/06	-0.10389104 -0.19693942		
1 027 2	-0.08988411 -0.08993304	-0.247 1877		
886	-0.0575334	-0.26913136		
174 60241	-0.10355160	-0.20720712		
639	-0.10564668 -0.11936023	0.70A76771 -0.03519936		
68097	-0.12332364	-0.21797112		
275				

TABLE A-3 (Cont'd)

60330	HTC	RELATIVE RESIDUAL (1979)	RELATIVE REBIDUAL (1980)
61165	60930	-0+12466791	4A 1 20 MA1 88
612			
60476 -0.44373253 -0.4101778 64356 -0.162833096 -0.19927026 65113 -0.1/423617 -0.19704267 60002 -0.4460194 -0.30742765 207 -0.20539560 0.00728845 63032 -0.21630193 -0.14465214 60701 -0.22572443 -0.14465214 65728 -0.22472443 -0.1942927 63116 -0.22772495 -0.40833462 63043 -0.23748246 -0.1333593 70240 -0.2636834 -0.1333593 62741 -0.24025943 -0.3407324 62741 -0.24025943 -0.35494693 62741 -0.24025943 -0.35494693 62741 -0.24025943 -0.3133649 62661 -0.33336664 -0.3133649 62761 -0.33740409 -0.5970342 6286 -0.35736841 -0.3573683 60296 -0.3529361 -0.3771642 60296 -0.36293861 -0.3771642 603 -0.41459372 -0.32297625 605 -0.37318666 -0.3771642 <th></th> <th></th> <th></th>			
66356			
66818	* * · · · ·		
\$0102		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
207			
63002		771711111	
COPPOI			
G5928 63116 -0.22774295 63043 -0.23748246 -0.2373865 -0.24373865 -0.24373865 -0.24373865 -0.2340834 -0.240834 -0.26308344 -0.26308344 -0.36494693 62741 -0.20026983 188 -0.20026983 125 -0.20026983 -0.344710409 -0.35438431 -0.3573344686 -0.34710409 -0.37995107 -0.3798815 -0.3798815 -0.3798815 -0.37988164 -0.37987614 -0.3798761 -0.37987788 -0.37987788 -0.37987788 -0.37987788 -0.37987789 -0.37987878 -0.37987878 -0.37987878 -0.37987878 -0		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
60106			
63043			
70240			
6829/ -0.27040934 -0.38494693 62741 -0.28025983 -0.31433649 181 -0.28031769 -0.36030733 62667 -0.33386864 -0.105574623 18.			
62741			*****=====
173	62741		
125			
16		******	
109		*****	*
60296			
60% 251			
251			• • • • • • • •
121			
40b			
23\	~ -		********
102		* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	
849			
28 -0.44091448 -0.27614284 61169 -0.44627642 -0.27.527965 228 -0.48606978 -0.5332198 61665 -0.51152946 -0.45648041 62271 -0.54624139 -0.33525915 255 -0.61152978 -0.55259770 205 -0.61152197 -0.58420752	649		
228			*
61865 -0.51152946 -0.45648041 62271 -0.54824139 -0.33525915 255 -0.61132978 -0.53259770 205 -0.61132197 -0.38420752			*******
62271 -0.54624139 -0.45646041 255 -0.61112478 -0.31525915 205 -0.61157195 -0.58229770			
255			• • • • • • • •
203		-0.61132418	
E1514 MD . 67491197			
	61414	-0.62463197	**********

TABLE A-4

CORRELATION MATRIX

MIL

CS x MII							7	86.
NB x MIL						7	€0	08
BTU					7	.15	30	28
ACRE				=	.41	.03	.03	.03
AREA			1	. 56	.80	.11	-,33	29
CIV			.83	.39	.17	60.	34	32
MIL		, i	.35	. 36	. 29	.43	10	11
B0S	1	•39	68.	.55	.83	.21	38	37
	BOS	MIL	AREA	ACRE	BTU	NB x MIL	CS x MIL	CS x AREA

Note: Except for NB and CS, all variables are in logarithmic form, the form they have in the regression. NB is a dummy variable with value I for Naval bases, and 0 otherwise. Recall that our definition of Naval bases includes Naval stations, amphibious bases and submarines bases. CS is a dummy variable for communications stations and security activities.